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ABSTRACT.  This  paper  addresses  the  question  of  how  literary  and
philosophical thinking can converge in experience of a literary work. Peter
Lamarque  and  Stein  Haugom  Olsen,  in  Truth,  Fiction,  and  Literature,
dispute this possibility, and this discussion responds to their view, with
particular attention to their account of thematic interpretation. Thematic
interpretation is presented here as involving thought about the reasons
behind a work’s use of its content and other features. Those reasons have
an implicit generality that allows us to move from literary specificity to
general,  philosophically  significant  thought.  Philosophy’s  need  for  the
kind of thinking supported by literature, exploring patterns, priorities and
less than universal claims, is defended. George Eliot’s novel  Middlemarch
and Lydia Davis’s story ‘Ethics’ provide illustrations of the issues.
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In bringing literature into my philosophical work, I am moved by a
desire “to have my cake and eat it too”. By that I mean that I want to
let  literature  be  what  it  is,  to  be  literary,  and be  a  philosophically
powerful domain. It is not easy to pin down either of the terms here –
the  literary  and  the  philosophical.  Starting  with  some  loose
associations,  I  could  press  the  unreasonableness  of  my  desire  by
pointing  out  that  literature  seems  to  be  a  domain  of  audacity,
idiosyncratic  expression,  delicacy,  playfulness,  wishing,  wallowing,
pleasure  and  unregimented  diversity.  It  is  not  a  domain  in  which
terms are explained and consistently used, general positions and lines
of  reasoning  carefully  developed,  and  in  which  public  debate  and
shared goals of understanding are at least supposed to unite different
thinkers.  The  constraints  on  and  the  possibilities  for  literary
achievement  seem  to  float  too  free  of  the  demands  and  aims  of
philosophical thinking. Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen have
argued  for  an  in-principle  divergence  of  literature  and  philosophy,
emphasising both the features of philosophical inquiry that are lacking
in  literary  practice  and  the  inappropriateness  of  imposing
philosophical goals on literary works.1 They offer a strong rebuff of the
“have your cake and eat it” tendency. I have made scattered attempts
to resist their arguments, and this essay is another attempt.2 
My  approach  is,  first,  to  present  some  of  the  central  views  of
Lamarque and Olsen concerning the distinction between philosophy
and literature. My focus is on how they understand the role of themes
and  thematic  interpretation  in  literary  practice.  I  respond  to  their
views from two directions, in part offering a view of how to respect
the  literary  “fingerprint”  of  a  work  while  integrating  it  into
philosophical  enquiry,  and  in  part  by  making  a  brief  case  for
expanding  the  conception  of  activities  proper  to  philosophical
1 I will refer extensively to Lamarque and Olsen’s  Truth, Fiction, and Literature. Passages
will be cited in the text using the abbreviation TFL.
2 E.g., JOHN 1998 and 2003. 
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practice. The point of this will be to show that there is convergence
between what people do as philosophers and readers of literature. I
will refer to two literary examples to illustrate how these practices can
converge,  George  Eliot’s  novel  Middlemarch and  Lydia  Davis’s  very
short  story  ‘Ethics’.  These  examples  were  not  chosen  at  random;  I
think they make it particularly easy for me to make my case. But my
position here is not that one needs to see every work of literature as
philosophically  engaging,  but  just  that  for  some works,  responding
fully to them as literature involves philosophical thinking. 
1. Lamarque and Olsen on literary and philosophical
practices
Thematic  interpretation is  of  interest,  with respect  to the literature-
philosophy relation, because it involves associating literary works with
general concepts and issues that could be the focus of philosophical
study. Literary themes “look” like the stuff of philosophy. Lamarque
and Olsen consider themes such as the opposition between values of
art and values of life and love in several Ibsen plays3,  freedom and
determinism in Euripides’ Hippolytus4 and, in relation to George Eliot’s
Middlemarch, the claim that «the best human hopes and aspirations are
always thwarted by forces beyond human control»5. Taking the subject
matter  of  a  work  to  be  the  events,  places  and  agents  it  depicts,
thematic concepts «are used to identify the point and purpose of the
subject and the way in which the subject is presented»6. On Lamarque
and Olsen’s view, thematic interpretation is built into the activity of
literary appreciation. «To recognize something as a literary work is to
recognize  it  as  being  intended  to  convey  a  humanly  interesting
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significance,  that  its  deepest,  most  universally interesting content  is
formulated8. 
While  a  literary  theme  can  look  like  the  articulation  of  a
philosophical topic or issue, for Lamarque and Olsen a literary theme
has its  raison d’être in relation to the work it helps to interpret, rather
than serving, for instance, the project of philosophical knowledge. 
The  statement  of  a  philosophical  theme  that  organizes  the
identified  poetic  vision,  is,  in  and  for  itself,  without  much
significant  content.  Only  by  relating  the  thematic  statement
back to the literary work does it become anything but empty
words. But when the thematic statement is related to the work,
it  also  receives  a  unique  interpretation.  The  situation
represented in a literary work is created through a series of
rhetorical and structural means that is the fingerprint of the
work. The situation presented by a literary work is therefore
unrepeatable.9 
The interest of a given work’s thematic content is not separable from
the  concrete  realization  it  receives  –  the  way  the  theme  itself  is
interpreted – in the detailed mode of presentation of subject matter
unique to that work. The value of the theme-invoking statements we
make in interpreting a work «rests with their value in making sense of
the literary work», rather than showing the work to offer a repeatable
pattern  or  «an  exemplum of  a  general  concept»10.  On  this  basis
Lamarque and Olsen argue against claims that literature contributes
specifically to moral philosophy, as «Any attempt to construe a literary
work as part of a moral argument would identify the features of the
work  that  contributed  to  making  the  situation  in  that  work
‘exemplary’,  […]  the  features  that  would  define  the  situation  as
repeatable»11. While we can treat a literary work as offering a repeatable
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example, that is incompatible with treating it as a literary work – it
would  mean  ignoring  its  unique  literary  fingerprint.  Finally,  and
importantly,  in playing this  central  role in literary appreciation,  «A
theme is not the kind of entity that can be true or false. Rather it is
interesting or uninteresting»12. 
For Lamarque and Olsen, philosophical practice, in contrast, is like
the sciences in being a practice of enquiry «based on a conception of
truth and truth-telling». Its enquiries are «located within a nexus of
activities such as making judgements, reasoning, providing evidence,
questioning, debating, falsifying, and so forth»13. The philosopher aims
to reach truths that can be held as knowledge, rather than prioritizing
the  interestingness  of  ideas,  and  this  means  that  evidence  and
argument have an essential role in philosophical practice: the truths
are  reached  by  processes  governed  by  the  aim  of  providing
justification14.  They  point  out,  persuasively,  that  views  claiming
literature provides forms of knowledge commonly do not show how to
distinguish «genuine and merely putative knowledge», leaving us too
often with claims to the effect that literature can help us to see «things
in a new light»15. Lamarque and Olsen marshal a range of examples
and evidence to show that literary practice is not constituted by the
activities  and goals  essential  to  a  truth-seeking practice of  enquiry.
They emphasize that we do not seem to evaluate a work of literature






16 See, e.g., TFL, 297-300 and 331-8. See ROWE 1997, STECKER 2012, and JOHN 2016b for some
counterclaims about literary practice.
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2.  Can  a  philosophical  enquirer  respect  a  literary
footprint?
It  seems right  that  one can extract a  set of  features from a literary
work, for purposes of  generalisation, in such a way that  one is  not
drawing  on  the  work’s  literary  qualities.  Perhaps  Conan  Doyle’s
character Sherlock Holmes, when cited by philosophers as an example
of  a  fictional  character,  loses  whatever  distinctively  literary
significance he has as a character. All we are concerned with is that
Sherlock  Holmes  exemplifies  two  very  general  features:  being
attributed some human or agential features in a work of fiction and
not actually realizing any of those features. Sherlock Holmes becomes
an  easily  repeatable  paradigm  in  the  service  of  philosophical
discourse. Less extremely, a philosopher might cite a philosophically
interesting combination of features attributed to a fictional character or
event,  to  illustrate  a  certain  idea or  issue (say,  weakness  of  will  or
moral luck or the constituents of an emotion). Although attending to
that combination of features might be quite important to appreciating
the literary work,  what the philosopher might well  be interested in
drawing from the work in such cases would be a neatly extractable and
repeatable pattern. Lamarque and Olsen lead us to press the question
of  how  one  could  move  fruitfully  from  a  unique  literary  work  to
philosophical discourse that seeks generality and that relies on claims
meshing with each other  conceptually  and logically.  Is  it  inevitable
that in making such a move, one will betray the way meaning emerges
in  the  specific  interpretive  relations  between  literary  subject  and
theme?
In  denying  any  such  inevitability,  I  want  in  part  to  build  on
Lamarque and Olsen’s point that literary practice involves interpretive
response to  a  work.  The literarily “flattening” appeals  to works,  as
understood  by  Lamarque  and  Olsen,  seem  to  focus  on  their
representational and thematic content: the sets of features attributed to
a  character  or  a  represented world,  and the  thematic  meanings we
assign  to  them,  that  can  provide  exemplars  or  patterns  for
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generalization  –  the  content  of  our  thoughts  as  to  what  a  work  is
about. However, the experiential and reflective processes that generate
that  content  are  the  core  of  literary  practice,  and  they  are  an odd
mixture of individually unique activity and repeatable, generalizable
thinking. Of course,  as specific events of reading and interpretation
occurring in a given reader’s life, they are unique and unrepeatable,
and probably not even adequately knowable to the reader. It is hard to
introspect about the delicate movements of one’s experience, feeling
and thought as a reader.17 But in reaching some ideas about what a
work  is  importantly  about,  those  processes  surface  in  a  way  that
aspires to be interpersonally defensible and adequate to the work. We
try to use the partially unreflective and experientially complex input of
the reading experience to make sense of what the work is importantly
about.  This  involves  asking  questions,  as  Lamarque  and Olsen say,
about the points and purposes served by the work’s specificities  of
subject, language, tone and structure. We carry out a steady (if also
ordinarily somewhat lazily articulated) questioning of what all of this
amounts to. 
In many cases,  it  is  not  precisely the content  that  is  relevant,  but
what might be called the how and the why of the use of that content in
the work. What is assumed to be worth saying and for what reason,
what  is  neglected  or  suppressed  (and  again,  why),  what  is  circled
around obsessively or inconclusively? What gets to show up as funny,
dull,  frightening,  charming  or  disastrous?  How  does  this  work’s
approach to whatever it  represents differ  from other approaches  or
from what one might expect? Such questions about how and why a
work  uses  its  elements  as  it  does  enable  one  to  reach  ideas  about
theme.  But  when  these  ideas  gain  plausibility  for  a  reader,  their
plausibility is not just based on seeing that the thematic concepts are
instantiated in the detailed subject matter of the work. The thematic
thinking  also  includes  positing  or  constructing  a  kind  of  space  of
17 As Susan Feagin notes, «one can respond appropriately to features of a work of fictional
literature without knowing that one is and without being able to defend the claim that
one is» (FEAGIN 1996, 159). Feagin gives unusually deft reconstructions of possible «shifts,
slides, and sensitivities» in reading experience (see chapters 3-5).
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reasons in which one can see a point to instantiating and varying a
theme in these ways. This space of reasons is filled out in the reader’s
thinking about whether it makes sense to interpret this subject matter
in these thematic terms, in positing reasons for instantiating a theme
in this  way, and in considering whether this  thematic realization is
important or worth doing – does it illuminate the issue articulated by
the theme? These interpretive activities  can lead fairly directly  into
generalizing  or  generalizable  thought  because,  even  if  initiated  by
quite  small-scale  input,  the  questions  raised  concern  relevance
relations,  purposes  and  the  importance  of  the  thematic  “angle”
offered.  Answering  such  questions  implicitly  calls  on  the  reader’s
grasp of not just the elements to be interpreted, but on some more-or-
less general views on what can be relevant to a thing’s meaning, what
can count as a purpose for a certain sort of element, and what needs
illumination in a given context. So, to the extent that readers interpret
the work as embodying reasons for using representational content and
other elements in a thematically charged way, the reader reaches some
ideas  about  the  work  that  have  general,  repeatable  import.  The
detailed relation between subject and theme with its unique literary
fingerprint  is  not  ignored,  but  that  relation  is  approached  as
answering (ideally) to a demand to have reasons for constructing a
work in this way, with this meaning. While those reasons concern the
work’s  fingerprint,  their  reasonableness  is  not  simply  given  or
constituted by the work’s self-contained way of proceeding. We test
this kind of reasonableness in a complex way, in  part by letting the
work build  up its  own context  in  which things  “make  sense”  in  a
work-anchored  way  (often  supported  by  literary  and  genre
conventions), but also by implicitly placing the work in some larger
comparison  class  of  real  and  possible  projects  of  expression  and
representation. We draw on a context of activities and concerns that
stretch beyond the work and whatever it offers, to recognize what is
particular to and of interest in this particular project. As interpreters
we are testing whether such meaning can be supported in these terms
and  what  the  point  of  doing  so  could  be,  and  those  are  general
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questions,  taking  us  “outside”  the  work  into  larger  practices  of
identifying meaning, purpose and importance.
Although it is difficult for most readers to articulate their views on
the “space of reasons” built into a work, these views can emerge in
discussion  and  argument.  I  take  this  kind  of  discussion  –  about
whether fictional events can be found meaningful in certain ways and
about  the  possible  reasons  for  pursuing  a  given  meaning-making
project – to be central to literature’s relevance to philosophical enquiry.
Let me give one example of the kind of argument that can grow out of
literary interpretation. Lamarque and Olsen give a detailed reading of
the  following  passage,  concerning  the  character  Dr  Lydgate,  from
Chapter 15 of George Eliot’s novel Middlemarch: 
Lydgate’s spots of commonness lay in the complexion of his
prejudices,  which,  in  spite  of  his  noble  intention  and
sympathy,  were half  of them such as are found in ordinary
men of the world: that distinction of mind which belonged to
his  intellectual  ardour,  did  not  penetrate  his  feeling  about
furniture,  or  women  […].  He  did  not  mean  to  think  of
furniture  at  present;  but  whenever  he  did  so,  it  was  to  be
feared that neither biology nor schemes of reform would lift
him  above  the  vulgarity  of  feeling  that  there  would  be  an
incompatibility in his furniture not being of the best.18
Here is part of Lamarque and Olsen’s reading, including mention of
the thematic statement they appeal to in their interpretation.
The ironic tone of the passage also underlines that Lydgate’s
weaknesses  and the  influence  of  Middlemarch are  not  only
forces  beyond  the  control  of  Lydgate  himself  but  are  also
beyond the limits of his intellectual grasp. They can therefore
destroy him all the more effectively. It is only when grasping
the passage in some such way that the reader appreciates it
properly as an aesthetic element in the work. However,  this
18 ELIOT 1880 [1871], 134; quoted at TFL, 335.
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appreciation  does  not  involve  the  reader  asking  further
questions about the truth of the proposition ‘The best human
hopes and aspirations are always thwarted by forces beyond
human control’.19
 
That is, the reader does not pursue the questions that a philosopher
would ask. Of such a thematic statement, Lamarque and Olsen say, we
require that it be intelligible, but not that it be true, as «It is the content
of  the  proposition,  what  it  is  about,  that  confers  interest  on  the
Lydgate  story»20.  Now,  to  respond  well  to  Lamarque  and  Olsen’s
interpretation would be  a  long task,  calling  for  attention to  a  long
novel. I will initiate a response by saying that I take there to be a lot to
argue about here. The Lydgate story is indeed about a gifted, aspiring
person  whose  noble  aims  come  mostly  to  nothing.  The  traits  and
«spots of commonness» that make him vulnerable to frustration of his
aims  seem  to  be  only  partially  visible  to  him,  even  after  long
experience.  His  eventual  career  of  catering  to  wealthy  patients  is
summarized,  damningly:  «In  brief,  Lydgate  was  what  is  called  a
successful  man»21.  But  why  is  his  story  told  in  this  novel?  When
Lydgate is introduced, the narrating-authorial  voice says,  «The man
was still  in the making […] and there were both virtues and faults
capable of shrinking or expanding»22. His story is told, I would say (in
my attempt to understand the reasons behind his story), to make sure
that we feel the potential for great good in a life and feel the waste and
wrongness in it coming to nought. But that it comes to nought does
not seem to be a matter of what is “always” the case. The virtues could
have expanded and the faults could have shrunk. Interpretations can
importantly  disagree  on  precisely  such  matters  of  quantification:
should we see universal principles or messier “sometimes” principles
in  operation?  Tzachi  Zamir  makes  a  persuasive  case  for  the
significance of literature to our need to establish principles that are not
19 TFL, 335-6.
20 TFL, 329, 330.
21 ELIOT 1880 [1871], 749.
22 ELIOT 1880 [1871], 133.
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«a categorical ‘For all  cases of type X, Y is the case’» but rather «a
particular  affirmative  or  negative  judgment  of  the  form:  ‘For  some
cases of X, Y is the case’»23. If we take Lydgate’s story as instantiating a
“sometimes Y is the case” principle, then we can ask further questions
about the conditions that make the difference. We can experience the
world  of  Middlemarch not  as  one  in  which  human  aspirations  are
doomed,  but  as  one  in  which  the  details  of  education,  social
convention,  contingencies  of  friendship and love,  laws and political
life, and individual virtues and vices put noble aspirations at risk. In
disagreeing  about  thematic  interpretation,  we  can  argue  about  the
reasons and purposes embodied in the work, and these will concern
the real commitments and aims of the project undertaken in the work
(not just the internal realization of thematically meaningful elements).
The reader of  Eliot’s  novel  also has to situate the point  of  telling
Lydgate’s  story  in  relation  to  other  characters’  stories.  Dorothea
Brooke’s life is summed up quite differently in the final paragraphs of
the novel. 
Certainly those determining acts of her life were not ideally
beautiful.  They  were  the  mixed  result  of  young  and  noble
impulse  struggling  amidst  the  conditions  of  an  imperfect
social state […] But the effect of her being on those around her
was incalculably diffusive: for the growing good of the world
is partly dependent on unhistorical acts; and that things are
not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half
owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life.24
Like Lydgate, Dorothea is an exemplar of «the best human hopes and
aspirations», and one could say that her aspirations were thwarted.
The tangible output of her life seems to be that she has a happy life as
a wife and mother. That she is a woman in her time seems to be one of
the crucial conditions obstructing her ability to have a broader, more
substantial  impact,  but  it  is  also  due,  as  with  Lydgate,  to  her
23 ZAMIR 2007, 8.
24 ELIOT 1880 [1871], 752.
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temperament and the people with whom she falls in love. However,
this final passage makes a plea for less easily measurable criteria of
evaluation – for «incalculably diffusive» good effects. With Dorothea
and other characters in mind, it is possible to finish this novel with
some fairly concrete ideas about how to change society so that people’s
aspirations are not inevitably thwarted (do not stifle the talents and
ideas of women, strengthen economic fairness, enforce transparency in
banking(!),  for  example).  The mix of characters and their  fates,  and
such partial contrasts as the one between Lydgate and Dorothea, can
lead  a  reader  to  gravitate  toward  the  relevance  of  “sometimes”
principles. 
Lamarque  and  Olsen  are  elsewhere  incisively  attentive  to  the
narrating  and  authorial  presence  Eliot  has  in  her  fiction.  She  is
«notorious as an intrusive author,  often given to lecturing, certainly
one to prompt and push a reader in his judgements», but they temper
this account by noting that she is «scrupulous in presenting diverse
points of view»25.  «George Eliot never allows us to rest with a stock
judgement.  We are confronted with an enormously varied range of
attitudes […], shifting constantly and subtly through the novel. […]
She  will  not  rest  until  all  points  of  view  have  been  aired»26.  They
further note that in some of her interventions she nudges her readers
to reflect «on the characterization» rather than just responding «to the
intrinsic descriptions themselves» (e.g., notice which characters either
author or reader tends to neglect and consider why this is): she invites
readers «to stand back and reflect on the very process of acquiring
information about characters»27. Here Lamarque and Olsen articulate
important features that can feed into interpretation. I would say that
this  novel,  in  its  narration and in what it  asks of  readers,  is  partly
about  scrupulousness  and  ethical  concern  in  one’s  acquisition  of
knowledge.  The reader  who works  through Eliot’s  immensely  fine-
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of the “why” behind this novel’s characterizations – in the space of
reasons  built  into  Middlemarch,  extended  scrupulousness  is  needed
and  much  of  importance  is  hidden  from  routine,  conventional
observation. 
Returning  to  the  question  of  how  thematic  thinking  can  move
(somewhat) seamlessly into philosophical thinking, the point I want to
draw from discussion of Middlemarch is that development of thematic
content integrates the processes of taking in what the work offers and
of  understanding  reasons  for  those  elements.  Those  reasons  are
implicitly general and positing them can open up issues worth arguing
about (e.g., about universal or less-than-universal patterns, about what
can  be  understood  from  juxtaposing  two  life  stories,  about  the
qualities of observation, thought and feeling needed for representation
of human events). I find Middlemarch to be a powerful case for resisting
Lamarque and Olsen’s approach because it seems obvious to me that
Eliot wants us to accept – really accept – reasons for representing lives
in  certain  ways:  scrupulously  and  with  multiply  critical  and
sympathetic access, and as complicated, fragile mixtures of potential
for  good  and  vulnerability  to  waste  and  frustration.  The  strong
interventions of  a narrating-authorial  voice,  in this  particular novel,
make it hard to read it as a novel unconcerned with the extra-literary
project of understanding lives. That project need not be built into the
reasons behind every work of literature, but I have here initiated an
argument  that  the  literary  fingerprint  of  Middlemarch makes  that
project central. If one ascribes an implausibly strong thematic meaning
to  Lydgate’s  story  (that  noble  aspirations  are  always  thwarted  by
factors we cannot control), it is easier to suggest that thematic assertion
and  truth  are  irrelevant:  if  that  were the  thematic  claim,  it  would
indeed be  unpromising  to  tie  the  interest  of  the  novel  to  its  truth.
Deriving a “sometimes” thematic claim from Lydgate’s story means
engaging rather with a claim that has a greater chance of truth and
that  turns  us  back  to  the  novel  for  further  thinking  about  what
supports  and  stymies  aspirations.  Lamarque  and  Olsen  would  not
deny that the thematic claim returns us to the work’s detailed features,
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as that is their own view of the mutual interpretation of subject and
theme. What I think they would not grant is that in the effort to see
how  and  why  Lydgate’s  story  is  meaningful,  the  reader  will  be
considering the possible reasons for telling his story in this way, and
the  intelligibility  of  such  reasons  is  not  fictional,  as  it  were  –  real
possibilities  for  relevance,  purpose  and  importance  will  inform
interpretation.28 
So far I have made some positive claims about what we are doing as
thematic interpreters,  aiming to highlight the role of understanding
reasons for making a work meaningful. Let me briefly sketch a more
negative response to Lamarque and Olsen’s approach. When I try to
think of what it would be like to interpret a work without invoking
what  I  am  casting  as  a  genuine  space  of  reasons,  I  end  up  with
something like this:  the novel  links and contrasts,  say, Lydgate and
Dorothea  because  they  make  an  interesting,  complex  comparison
around the theme of failed aspiration. On this model, the interest lies
in the content generated by the comparing activity:  what matters is
that the content is intelligible, and perhaps that there is a good deal we
can think  or  say,  and  that  we can formulate  it  with  precision  and
subtlety.29 Lamarque and Olsen take the best  themes,  the perennial
themes, to be topics of enduring human interest,  which seems true,
but also like a wheel that does not need to spin on this account. If the
work’s way of developing a theme does not constitute a real “move”
with respect to that topic (e.g., an attempt to understand or otherwise
address this topic, as something of importance to us), then it is not
clear why it would matter that the theme is of perennial interest. Why
not  develop  intelligible,  precise,  subtle  treatments  of  anything
whatsoever?  That  we  would  be  interested  in  such  a  comparison
because we give it a chance to bear on how we actually understand,
say, failure of aspirations seems to be a more straightforward and solid
basis for interest in a work’s themes. Spinning out a subtle, precise line
28 This argument is related to the discussion in JOHN 2016a.
29 Lamarque and Olsen: «in literary appreciation it is the ‘specificity’ and ‘subtlety’ and
‘boldness’  of  the  artistic  vision,  the  vision  which  is  apprehended  through  thematic
interpretation, which is the focus of interest» (TFL, 403).
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of  thought  can of  course  be  part  of  what  we appreciate  in literary
experience.  But  the intrinsic “interestingness” of  the content  of  this
thinking, and the fact that the work has the power to propel us along
this content-bearing path, are a quite weak basis  for explaining the
interest of a theme. If a theme  is of independent human interest, as
Lamarque  and  Olsen  require,  it  seems  its  interest  even  in  its
development within a work of literary fiction has to lie in the fact that
there is something of concern to people that we formulate and try to
understand by engaging with that  thematic  development.  It  is  true
that we do not infer that a work lacks literary worth on the basis of
judging it to be wrong-headed or actively false in its development of
thematic content. But that does not mean we take that development to
be irrelevant to understanding. It can still be the case that a literary
development of theme is of interest to us because that development
makes an attempt to understand something of concern to us, perhaps a
controversial move that we reject.30 (I will say a bit more to complicate
the relation between understanding, truth and philosophy in the next
section.)  A reader of course does not have to accept that a work of
literature embodies good reasons in how it proceeds, but in seeking to
find meaning and purpose in its elements readers aim to put the work-
internal elements into an intelligible space of reasons. Our thematic
thinking thus links the literary fingerprint to general ideas, questions
and principles. 
3. Why is philosophical progress difficult?
In Virginia Woolf’s novel To the Lighthouse, the work of her philosopher
30 See Stecker on appreciation of nihilistic fiction that explores a view one rejects (STECKER
2008, 159), and Zamir on distinguishing «voices that are valuable to have, and those that
encapsulate values that one takes to be correct»  (ZAMIR 2007, 41). Stecker affirms that
philosophy and literature share an openness to the cognitive value of the false or the not
obviously true: «Just as in philosophy, we do not value most writing that sets out views
we agree with […] we value writing that effectively challenges  our beliefs»  (STECKER
2012, 18).
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character  Mr  Ramsay  is  envisioned  using  an  analogy  between
philosophical progress and a kind of alphabetical piano keyboard: 
For if thought is like the keyboard of a piano, divided into so
many notes, or like the alphabet is ranged in twenty-six letters
all in order, then his splendid mind had no sort of difficulty in
running over those letters one by one, firmly and accurately,
until it had reached, say, the letter Q. He reached Q. Very few
people in the whole of England ever reach Q. […] But after Q?
What comes next? […] Still, if he could reach R, it would be
something. […] R is then – what is R? […] A shutter, like the
leathern eyelid of a lizard, flickered over the intensity of his
gaze and obscured the letter R.31 
This is not an immediately flattering image of philosophical labour:
the orderly pressing of keys is a seemingly shallow achievement that
comes inexplicably to a halt, and the lizard’s eyelid perhaps summons
up utter indifference to human reflection. It  is hard to be confident
that there would be an important difference between Q and R. There is
also the non-philosophical jockeying and insecurity in the image, of
clinging to Q as a relatively privileged achievement that at least sets
him apart from other thinkers. But perhaps it is also an elegant image
of the inexplicable difficulty of moving with reason from a point one
understands to a further point. It seems one ought to be able to tell
what comes next, if one really understands the point one has reached.
The image makes it seem as if there is clarity, order and good sense all
the way to Q. But whatever substance is built into the well-ordered
path to Q, it resists showing the substantial way to proceed. Even with
its  sharp  edge  of  humour,  and  fairly  merciless  dissection  of  a
character’s limitations, I think Woolf’s image is also a lovely image for
the stymied moments of philosophical thinking. One can experience a
rift between what seems obvious and what cannot even be formulated
clearly.  In  the  image’s  evocation  of  musical  and alphabetical  order,
31 WOOLF 1927, 53-4.
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unsettling questions are lightly raised: where do the constraints and
forms of order a philosopher takes for granted come from? Do they go
deep  enough  in  offering  insight?  I  would  say  that  the  imagined
impasse at Q, with the goal of somehow figuring out how to move on
from it, is a good image for important phases of philosophical enquiry.
One way of  explaining the stymied moments is that the forms of
order  and  progress  that  philosophers  rely  on  have  important
limitations.  Consider  some  paradigmatic  philosophical  activities:
generalisation from instances, analysis of concepts, and argument in
its various forms (deductive, inductive and abductive). To generalise
helpfully we need some idea of what features things have importantly
in common, and observation of those things does not inevitably bring
with it “importance markers”. We are likely to need to try out different
patterns and priorities for grouping things,  and to reflect on which
groupings interest us. To analyse a concept, aiming to unpack essential
requirements  for  its  application,  is  strangely difficult  for  competent
users of a concept (and we can argue about why that is and perhaps
reject the analysis project). There seems to be a gap between effectively
recognizing  and  distinguishing  things  in  the  world  in  conceptual
terms  and  reflectively  knowing  the  bases  on  which  we  do  this.
Deductive argument, though in some sense an ideal, is conservative
with respect to content; we do not get more out of it than we already
had  in  the  premises.  So  generating  plausible,  relevant  premises  to
work with is  crucial  to the fruitfulness of  deductive argument,  and
premises  emerge  from  many  sources  and  modes  of  observation,
reflection and argument (such as inductive and abductive reasoning,
which in turn have openness and constraints that are not self-evident).
While  generalisation,  analysis  and  argument  are  central,  valuable
modes  of  philosophical  activity,  they  all  have  roots  in,  and  are
beholden  to,  less  transparent,  less  easy-to-regulate  projects  of
gathering, organizing, and prioritizing relevant materials. If we grant
that the paradigmatic philosophical activities have built-in limitations,
and need to be coordinated with such projects as pattern formation
and recognition, testing for priority and importance, and generation of
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plausible,  apt  premises,  then  we  have  some  insight  into  why
philosophical  progress  is  difficult  and  can  reach  an  impasse.  The
paradigms of order and good sense are usually not able to carry out
the  ice-breaking,  new-pattern-exposing,  priority-claiming,  and
content-establishing  activity  needed  for  philosophical  progress.  My
claim here, of course, is that literature is a domain in which such less
transparent but also philosophically essential projects can be carried
out.
Before turning to a concluding literary example, I want to note some
ideas about philosophy that I take to be implicitly sympathetic to or
actively  supportive  of  this  claim.  I  have  already mentioned  Tzachi
Zamir’s argument for the importance of non-universal knowledge (for
the prevalence of “Some X are Y” issues), especially in the realm of
moral  principles.  He  also  argues  for  the  potential  of  literary
experience,  because  of  its  experiential  impact,  to  move  us  beyond
impasses on «foundational questions of value» that cannot be resolved
by argument32. David Davies supports the potential of literary fiction
for  philosophical  thought  experiment  on the  basis  that  response to
fiction  can  «mobilize  unarticulated  cognitive  resources  based  in
experience.  The  fiction  […]  makes  manifest  constant  patterns
underlying  the  complexity  of  actual  experience»33.  More  broadly,
Catherine  Elgin  and  Neil  Cooper  argue  persuasively  for  the
importance  of  philosophical  understanding,  distinguishing
understanding  from  knowledge  of  truths.  Their  accounts  of
understanding suggest or, in Elgin’s case, explicitly claim that it makes
sense to look to art and literature for understanding. Cooper says that
«understanding a fact or truth involves  being able to appreciate its
importance  and  this  involves  a  value-judgement  of  the  relative
importance of the different things we know»34. He uses metaphors of
exploration  and  spatial  orientation,  presenting  understanding  as
«knowing how to get from one part to another, how to connect them,
32 ZAMIR 2007, 93.
33 DAVIES 2007, 160.
34 COOPER 1994, 4.
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and how to distinguish them»35. Understanding is «open-ended» in that
it is shown in the ability «to ask new questions to which answers are
not yet known»36. Elgin emphasises the value of understanding drawn
from  models  that  are  strictly  false:  «Effective  models  afford  an
understanding  of  their  targets  because  their  simplifications,
idealizations,  elaborations,  and  distortions  make  salient  important
features of the targets»37. She emphasizes our stance as goal-directed
enquirers,  aiming  «to  structure,  synthesize,  organize,  and  orient
ourselves toward things in ways that serve our ends»38. In interpreting
a model, we try to grasp «how, in what respects, and with what degree
of precision the model represents»39. Elgin links literary fictions and
scientific  models  as  similarly  constituting  a  «cognitive  environment
where  certain  aspects  of  their  subjects  stand  out.  They  thereby
facilitate  recognition  of  those  aspects  and  appreciation  of  their
significance»40. The selective and goal-serving nature of such models
means  that  they  are  never  perfect  or  comprehensive,  but  always
marginalise or obscure some aspects of what they seek to represent.41
These  latter  points  about  simultaneously  revealing  and  obscuring
resonate with discussions of literature’s  power to give us important
but partial insights.42 To sum up some of the points gestured at here:
philosophy,  if  philosophy  seeks  understanding,  partial  and  non-
universal  knowledge,  and  access  to  non-  or  not-yet  conceptualised
cognitive  resources,  needs  to  embrace  methods,  thinking  and
experience suited to those goals.  
35 COOPER 1994, 4.
36 COOPER 1994, 10.
37 ELGIN 2017, 249.
38 ELGIN 2017, 250.
39 ELGIN 2017, 253.
40 ELGIN 2017, 258.
41 ELGIN 2017, 263-71.
42 E.g., Jollimore notes that different metaphors «that are at the very least practically and
psychologically incompatible – in the sense that no human agent could see reality in both
ways at once – can nonetheless be regarded as insightful, and even as true» (JOLLIMORE
2009, 156). Gibson distinguishes the truth about a cultural ethos from the moral truth
about that ethos (GIBSON 2011, 84-5).
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4. Can literature help make philosophical progress?
I will conclude with one suggestive example, an extremely short story
by Lydia Davis. As noted above, this choice is intended to make my
argumentative  life  easier.  The  story,  ‘Ethics’,  involves  a  character
directly discussing a question of philosophical ethics. Nonetheless, I
do  not  think  I  am  “cheating”;  if  I  need  to  show the possibility  of
philosophical  and literary convergence,  even one story can provide
evidence. Here is the entire story:
‘Do  unto  others  as  you would  have  others  do  unto  you.’  I
heard, on an interview program about ethics, that this concept
underlies  all  systems  of  ethics.  If  you  really  do  unto  your
neighbour as you would have him do unto you, you will be
living according to a good system of ethics. At the time, I was
pleased to learn of a simple rule that made such sense. But
now, when I try to apply it literally to one person I know, it
doesn’t seem to work. One of his problems is that he has a lot
of hostility toward certain other people and when I imagine
how he would have them do unto him I can only think he
would  in  fact  want  them  to  be  hostile  toward  him,  as  he
imagines they are, because he is already so very hostile toward
them. He would also want them to be suspicious of him to the
same degree that he is suspicious of them, and bitter about
him as he is  bitter  about them,  because  his  feelings against
them are so strong that he needs the full strength of what he
imagines to be their feelings against him in order to continue
feeling what  he wants  to feel  against  them. So,  really,  he is
already doing unto those certain others as he would have them
do unto him, though in fact it occurs to me that at this point he
is  only  having  certain  feelings  about  them  and  not  doing
anything to them, so he may still be quite within some system
of ethics, unless to feel something toward someone is in fact to
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do something to that person.43 
The pleasure of reading this seems to lie partly in the way it flirts with
simply  being  a  stretch  of  philosophical  argument.  Exploring  and
reconstructing  this  story’s  “space  of  reasons”  seems  to  include
thinking about why it is so close to being that and yet is not simply
that. We can identify it as a story, perhaps a bit hesitantly, because it
does have a sketchy narrative set-up. Something was heard (on the
radio?  perhaps  a  show  with  an  ethicist?),  and  it  triggered  two
reactions, one of which involves mentioning an acquaintance. So the
reader can situate the narrating thinker’s activity in a larger world of
people and discourse, and her claims about the impact of that world.
Although we learn very little about this larger world, it does not seem
that we can jettison it as irrelevant to the story’s “fingerprint”, as we
might quickly leave behind a philosopher’s mention of when and with
whom  an  issue  first  came  to  mind.  That  the  story  portrays  an
individual reacting to the promulgation of ideas in her world is made
salient – it  is selected for attention. Even though such reactions are
exactly what nearly every piece of philosophical writing conveys as
well, the phenomena of individual response are paradigmatically  not
made salient in philosophy. The reader of the story can thus ask why
one would write a story that makes this salient.
The specific line of thought that unfolds in the story starts with an
ethical rule, taken most directly from the Bible but having an older,
broader  lineage,  that  is  perhaps  stymieing  because  it  seems  so
sensible.44 If  one has soaked up an ethical education, it may have a
nearly platitudinous quality.  What is  there to think about or  argue
with  in  “do  unto  others”?  This  narrator  proceeds  to  ask  a  new
43 DAVIS 2009, 289-90.
44 From Matthew 7:12: «Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to
you,  do  ye  even  so  to  them:  for  this  is  the  law  and  the  prophets»  (King  James
translation). The story summons up the other ethical chestnut, “love thy neighbour”, by
introducing that word (“If you really do unto your neighbour”). Whether these rules
coincide,  or whether loving thy neighbour as thyself  is  a rather different demand, is
another question the story efficiently summons up.
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question  and  partially  unravels  the  rule,  by  persistently  thinking
things  that  it  seems  one  should  not  think.  I  will  note  two  of  the
“wrong thoughts”:  the narrator imagines what another would want
others to do unto him (instead of using herself as a “you” who needs
to interpret and act on the rule), and she picks someone filled with
hostility as her test case. This is the wrong person, and the wrong kind
of person, to imagine when testing a foundational  ethical  rule.  It  is
somehow  inappropriate  to  think  about  a  particular  person  at  all,
rather  than  a  generalized  exemplar  of  human  nature  without  any
idiosyncratic rough edges. In reacting to this story one can follow out
one’s own intricate reasoning about the ethical rule at hand. Why not
start with someone else, and indeed with a hostile person, if the rule
applies to all? And why isn’t the rule “Do unto others as they would
have  you  do  unto  them”  anyway?  These  are  the  beginnings  of
reflection  triggered  by  the  story,  basically  letting  it  present  an
imagined  counterexample.  I  think  the  questions  raised  here  are
independently interesting in philosophical terms. Does an ethical rule
of such simplicity depend on complicated or circular or controversial
assumptions about what people should want or what would count as a
genuinely  reciprocal  relation?  The  final  sentence  of  the  story  also
directly  poses  a  philosophical  question  about  whether  feelings  are
themselves “doings unto others”. This is a story from which one might
happily extract general,  repeatable content without much care for a
literary fingerprint. 
To find the literary and the philosophical converging in this story,
one has to consider what could belong in its “space of reasons”. As
Lamarque and Olsen would agree,  the  point  of  the  story  does  not
seem to be to reject  this  ethical  rule.  The story does not resolve its
tangle  of  issues.  It  uses  its  brief,  intense  form  to  make  salient  the
individual attempting to re-think a supposedly solid kernel of ethical
understanding. It uses its increasingly long, syntactically elaborate (yet
doggedly  coherent)  sentences  to  hint  at  an  endless  proliferation  of
complications and qualifications, arising perhaps whenever one has to
switch perspectives, from one person to another or within one’s own
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set of  shifting concerns and motives.  The narrative content,  despite
being  so  sparse,  “taints”  the  general  philosophical  content  with
possible perspectives and concerns. We cannot simply take the hostile
person  as  an  imagined  counterexample;  even  this  scant  hint  of  a
human relationship introduces a kind of “human impurity” into the
reasoning. Are the narrator’s  intrusive imaginings about the other’s
desires to be trusted? Who is the hostile person here, and where is the
hostility  coming  from?  The  story  will  not  let  its  readers  simply
question  the  applicability  of  “doing  unto  others”,  because  the
apparently  scrupulous  reasoning  is  simultaneously  the  evidence  of
emotional “doings” and possibly of great personal antagonism. The
story,  though  not  leaving  us  with  a  cogent  objection  to  “do  unto
others”,  does  leave  us  with  a  general  problem,  about  how  the
impersonal clarity and intelligibility of an ethical rule can meet the
ragged,  fixating,  imbalanced  substance  of  individual  thought  and
feeling.  Exploring  the  reasons  for  setting  philosophical  thinking
within  this  tiny human narrative  lead at  least  to  that  generalizable
issue.  An  aspect  of  the  literary  fingerprint  that  this  discussion
neglects, and that should not be neglected, is that the story is funny. It
would be  important,  in a  philosophically  full  engagement  with  the
story, to consider how the humour too helps one reach the problem of
ethical systems meeting human beings.
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